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Introduction 
Injuries, Remedies, Moral 
Rights, and the Public Domain 
To say that James Joyce was litigious is simply to recognize that 
he was as obsessed with the dialectic of injury and remedy in 
his practical affairs as he was in artistic matters. The pandying 
that Father Dolan inflicts upon Stephen Dedalus in A Portrait? 
although it would likely constitute a battery outside the walls of 
Clongowes (since Stephen's consent is coerced) and would implicate 
a student's due-process liberty interest if administered in a public 
school in the United States today1?is, within the Clongowes context, 
an injury for which there is no legal remedy. Instead, Stephen must 
seek a kind of gentlemen's injunction against further unwarranted 
pandyings by taking his case directly to the high court of the rector's 
office. Although Stephen appears to be granted his petition, his real 
victory is in the realm of the imagination: the dignitary wrong inflict 
ed by Father Dolan is compensated by a series of self-fashioned sym 
bolic remedies through which the beleaguered schoolboy identifies 
his plight with that of the "great men" of history (P 53), men like 
Charles Stewart Parnell, Christ, and Julius Caesar who suffered local 
injustice but triumphed in some larger moral and spiritual perspec 
tive. 
Joyce's major works, particularly A Portrait and Ulysses, return 
repeatedly to this theme of injury and remedy?the fundamental 
rhythm of the law, civil and criminal. Indeed, Joyce's fictions them 
selves can be viewed as fabulous remedies for actual wrongs, real or 
imagined. The figure of Buck Mulligan, for example, was the culmi 
nation of a carefully orchestrated plan of authorial self-help, whereby 
wrongs committed by Oliver Gogarty against the young Joyce, 
although not actionable at law, could be redressed at the bar of fiction. 
In creating the character of Mulligan, Joyce fashioned for himself a 
remedy that embodied both a compensatory and a punitive dimen 
sion: while Joyce could take satisfaction in the myth-inflected 
verisimilitude of his fictional rendering of Gogarty?much as the 
young Stephen Dedalus savors symbolic triumphs at Clongowes? 
Gogarty himself would be forced to pay a kind of punitive or exem 
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plary damages by serving, for all time, as the type of inconsequent, 
mercurial betrayal.2 
It is no surprise, therefore, that the magisterial legalism of Joyce's 
fictions should have been echoed in the litigiousness he sometimes 
exhibited in everyday affairs. Quick to spot an action that would lie, 
to use J. J. O'Molloy's lawyerly jargon in "Cyclops" (U 12.1043), Joyce 
instituted lawsuits, or contemplated them, on a variety of causes of 
action over the years: debt, slander, assault, and threat of future harm 
in his 1918-1919 actions against Henry Carr; copyright infringement 
and unfair competition ("passing off") in his 1927-1928 litigation 
against Samuel Roth; and damages for misuse of his name in the 1931 
Frankfurter Zeitung incident (JJ11 639-40).3 His efforts met with mixed 
success at best, and he paid an expatriate's price for pursuing legal 
remedies in jurisdictions where he could claim neither citizenship nor 
adequate familiarity with the law. In their contributions to this issue, 
Judge Conrad L. Rushing, Carol Shloss, and Paul Saint-Amour 
explore Joyce's various attempts to wring justice from alien legal sys 
tems. Mary Lowe-Evans and Fritz Senn show how responsive Joyce's 
texts are to the language and conceptual discourses of various legal 
regimes. 
David Weir, Walter Kendrick, and Carmelo Medina Casado shed 
light on Joyce's encounters with obscenity law and government cen 
sorship. In the wake of the 1921 Little Review trial in New York, Ulysses 
was 
effectively placed under legal ban in the United States. The Little 
Review's editors, Margaret Anderson and Jane Heap, were the actual 
defendants in that case. It was not until 1933 that the American ban 
could begin to lift as a consequence of the famous decision by feder 
al judge John M. Woolsey, a decision affirmed by a 2-to-l vote of the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals. In that 1933 case, famously cap 
tioned United States v. One Book Called 
"Ulysses," a single imported 
copy of Ulysses was the named defendant in a "libel" brought by the 
U.S. government,4 and Random House entered as claimant to chal 
lenge the government's attempt to have the copy condemned as 
obscene and therefore forfeit under the law. In both of those trials, 
Joyce was the real party in interest, as it were, bearing most of the bur 
dens and enjoying many of the benefits of the respective court rul 
ings. The original typed opinion signed by Judge Woolsey?which is 
preserved along with the rest of the record of the federal Ulysses liti 
gation in the Admiralty section of the National Archives for the 
Northeast Region in New York City?is reproduced photographical 
ly following this introduction (see Figure 1). We also include in this 
issue a short biographical account of Judge Woolsey by his son, John 
M. Woolsey Jr. 
Where censorship and obscenity laws were once the dominant 
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legal forces shaping the sociocultural existence of Ulysses, today that 
role has been assumed by copyright and related intellectual property 
regimes, as I have argued, for example, in the Yale Law Journal? That 
essay traces in considerable legal and historical detail the impact of 
American copyright law, obscenity laws, and customs seizures on the 
copyright status of Ulysses in America and concludes that, except for 
a brief period, the 1922 Paris edition of Ulysses has never enjoyed 
copyright protection in the United States, despite a kind of gentle 
men's agreement among competitors in the publishing world to wink 
at Random House's claim of exclusive rights to publish Ulysses.6 
Indeed, I believe we can pinpoint the date of that edition's entry into 
the American public domain?and Joyce knew it as well?as 3 April 
1922. 
My efforts, as well as those of Saint-Amour and others, have been 
directed toward encouraging a broader recognition of the public 
domain and the role it plays in the production of culture?a role dra 
matically altered by recent legislation in the United States and the 
European Union that retroactively increases copyright terms for 
works published in the early twentieth century Three years ago, part 
ly in an effort to harmonize U.S. copyright terms with those in the 
European Union, Congress passed the Sonny Bono Copyright Term 
Extension Act,7 which increased all future and existing American 
copyright terms by twenty years, thus preventing works first pub 
lished in 1923 and after from entering the public domain until well 
into the next century. The fate of modernism and the shape of the lit 
erary canon may be affected by this foreshortening of the public 
domain?a development that, in my view, places works of the early 
twentieth century at a competitive disadvantage in the cultural and 
economic 
marketplace. 
And that is not the only consequence. Think, for example, of how 
the specter of copyright loomed, without ever becoming fully mani 
fest, behind all the sound and fury of l'affaire Gabler-Kidd. I am not 
particularly referring here to efforts in the 1980s?uncovered by 
Chuck Rossman8?to secure a "new copyright"9 for Ulysses by means 
of a text freshly edited from manuscript materials. Whatever others 
may have wanted, Hans Gabler 's constructing of the "continuous 
manuscript text" was motivated, I am convinced, by a theory of 
authorship and by his own temperament, not by the carrot of copy 
right or the blandishments of interested parties. And if the Joyce 
Estate did seek to maintain a market for Ulysses,10 why should we be 
surprised? To fault a copyright owner for strategizing with publishers 
and editors is to deal in tautology11 A state-backed monopolist would 
scarcely seem rational if he or she did not seek to maximize profits 
and control. (As noted below, however, I feel that the Estate's more 
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recent efforts to assert control by means of aggressive lawsuits and 
frequent denials of permission to scholars and creative users have 
unnecessarily increased the public costs already imposed by long 
copyright terms. I therefore make a distinction between legitimately 
self-interested actions by a copyright owner and actions that are gra 
tuitous or vexatious, particularly where the copyright has already 
generated extraordinary benefits for its owners and survives into the 
present only by grace of statutory revival or extension.12) 
No, I am not concerned here with what anyone did with his copy 
right but rather with something larger and harder to get hold of than 
any predictable, and in any case lawful, scheming. I am thinking of 
the mood and discourse, the episteme, that quietly pervaded those 
noisy years. It was a time of shrill dichotomies, of intimidating 
either/ors: "either the unrevised state of the Rosenbach MS or the 
imperfectly typed transcripts of the lost drafts";13 "either the 1922 first 
edition or the 1961 Random House edition";14 either authorially 
transmitted notation or verifiably historical names; Connolly or 
Conolly; street or Street?either American pragmatism or Teutonic 
abstraction. It was the perfect moment and mindset for the rise of that 
master dichotomist, John Kidd. And we Joyceans, who had ended one 
decade by congratulating ourselves on having conquered the illusion 
of definitiveness, found ourselves at the end of the next waiting help 
lessly?if we waited at all?for the one true text, the unforthcoming 
Norton edition.15 
The common thread in all this was the assumption that one edition 
or editorial perspective must dominate, as of right. And this, I submit, 
was in large part the legacy of monopoly. The apocalyptic urgency of 
the choice between 
"Harry Thrift" and "Harry Shrift,"16 the nearly 
hysterical hectoring that we all endured about such matters, would 
have seemed rank hyperbole in ordinary circumstances, but it 
appeared plausible to us at the time because no affordable textual 
alternative was likely to be permitted. In the absence of alternatives, 
every editorial decision made by Gabler had a surreally momentous 
quality, ousting all other possibilities; every emendation became, as a 
matter of law, "definitive." 
And so the copyright monopoly informed the Joyce Wars in ways 
we still do not fully appreciate. Under nonmonopolistic conditions, of 
course, any "injury" that might have been caused by the Gabler text 
or the Rose edition could have been remedied quickly by versions of 
Ulysses drawn, re-edited or not, from the public domain. Fruitful 
competition among texts, rather than sterile innuendo and insult 
among interested parties, could have prevailed. But such a course 
was not even thinkable. (The reissue of the 1961 Random House text 
was a palliative, a lullaby.) The ten-years' war fought over accidentals 
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in Ulysses might have been better prosecuted as a united effort to lib 
erate the 1922 edition from illusory copyright in the United States. 
The scandal of Ulysses is that the remedy for our collective injury has 
quietly resided in the public domain all along. 
A taste for litigation seems to run in the Joyce family. As of this 
writing, Stephen James Joyce has instituted legal action, or threatened 
it, on several fronts. Copyright in Mr. Joyce's hands has become a 
sword as well as a shield, and the Estate now appears to be denying 
permissions routinely and often on the ground of personal taste. In 
The Irish Times for 10 June 2000, Medh Ruane reported that Mr. Joyce 
denied the request of a 23-year-old Irish composer, David Fenessy, to 
use 
eighteen words from Finnegans Wake in a short choral piece com 
missioned by Lyric FM for a Europe-wide broadcast. The brief quota 
tion from the Wake was "[a]s we there are where are we are we there 
from tomtittot to teetootomtotalitarian. Tea tea too oo" (FW 260.01 
03). Ruane quoted Mr. Joyce as having written Fennessy: "To put it 
politely, mildly[,] my wife and I don't like your music." The compos 
er was crushed and baffled: "I don't mind if they hate my music, but 
how can the personal taste of Stephen Joyce and his wife be thought 
the right criteria to use. . . . Now the whole thing is gone: it's not so 
much losing the commission fee, which I sorely needed, or the 
European broadcast. My piece can't ever exist because it can't be per 
formed." 
Similarly, in an article in The Independent (London) for 31 July 2000, 
Kate Watson-Smyth reported that Stephen James Joyce demanded 
that the Edinburgh Festival's Fringe organizers cancel a cabaret show, 
Molly Bloom, A Musical Dream, in which a Molly figure, played by 
Anna Zapparoli, lay atop a grand piano serving as her bed and relat 
ed her scandalous adventures. Zapparoli's adults-only reminiscences 
included 
"Song of the Big Hole," "Rap of Spunk," "Rap of Hip 
Bones," and "Song of Sucking." Mr. Joyce was quoted as objecting in 
particular to the treatment of Molly's soliloquy "as if it were a circus 
act or a jazz element in a jam session. This was clearly not the inten 
tion of the author."17 The Fringe producers, however, defended their 
right to use Joyce's text by invoking a U.K. copyright provision that 
grants a "license as of right" (or what is often called a "compulsory 
license") to anyone wishing to make use, in the U.K., of a work whose 
copyright was revived in 1996 by British legislation implementing the 
EU copyright-term Directive.18 A spokesperson stated that the Fringe 
"is one of the biggest platforms for free speech and it would be going 
against the spirit of it if we cancelled. We understand that the pro 
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duction is perfectly legal and the permission of the Joyce Estate is not 
needed so there is nothing we can, or would, do." 
Mr. Joyce evidently has no quarrel with the sexually explicit lan 
guage that his grandfather incorporated into "Penelope"; rather, it is 
various adaptations of the episode to which he objects. As quoted by 
Vanessa Thorpe in The Guardian/Observer, Mr. Joyce explained: "This 
last chapter/episode was not written for the stage, or to be per 
formed, but as the concluding part of a novel. I do not know who first 
authorised extracts from what has become known as the Molly Bloom 
monologue/soliloquy to be performed in theatres, even the radio, but 
looking back it was opening a Pandora's box."19 
These remarks suggest that Mr. Joyce seeks to protect his grandfa 
ther's works from being adulterated by the kinds of transformative 
insights that derivative works?as copyright law calls them?can 
bring to even the greatest, most comprehensive masterpieces. The 
attempt by a copyright owner to use his derivative-work right (that is, 
the right to prepare adaptations of the copyrighted work) to enforce a 
kind of moral right is nothing new.20 But the idea that Ulysses the 
"novel" (as Mr. Joyce called it) should remain faithfully confined to its 
own genre ignores the fact that Ulysses inhabits no such stable cate 
gory in the first place but instead owes much of its power as an avant 
garde work to its refusal to become the product of anything except its 
own generic volatility. Tipsily based on Homer's epic and 
Shakespeare's tragedy, and incorporating catechisms, newspaper 
headlines, expressionist drama, literature anthologies, and a fuga per 
canonem, Ulysses is a derivative work par excellence, a full, unabashed 
confession that cultural borrowings make up the fabric of art and life. 
In October 2000, the Irish High Court granted the Joyce Estate an 
interlocutory (preliminary) injunction preventing the Cork University 
Press from publishing extracts of Danis Rose's "Reader's Edition" of 
Ulysses ("RE") in an anthology entitled Irish Writing in the Twentieth 
Century: A Reader?1 The publisher of this large and impressive vol 
ume, which is edited by David Pierce, had originally sought the 
Estate's permission to publish extracts from an earlier Ulysses edition, 
but when the Estate insisted on a fee of ?7000-7500 sterling for 
extracts from the 1922 Paris edition, the Press decided to go with the 
Rose edition instead, apparently believing that it could do so without 
the Estate's permission under Irish regulations protecting "third par 
ties" who are affected by the revival of copyrights pursuant to the EU 
Directive.22 The Irish High Court agreed with the Estate's position, 
however, and granted the injunction?see Sweeney v. Nat'l Univ. of 
Ireland Cork, Trading as Cork University Press, No. 10497P/2000 (Ir. H. 
Ct. 9 October 2000)?whereupon the Press decided to forgo further 
litigation and instead print the anthology with the Joyce extracts neat 
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ly excised and a cardboard blank inserted bearing the notice: "Pages 
323-346 have been removed due to a dispute in relation to copyright." 
One reason why the Irish High Court was unwilling to let Cork 
University Press go forward with the Rose extracts was that separate 
litigation over the Rose edition had not yet concluded in Britain. In an 
independent lawsuit commenced in 1997, the Joyce Estate had sought 
an interlocutory injunction to prevent publication by British 
Macmillan/Picador of Danis Rose's "RE," at least in part because of 
Mr. Joyce's well-publicized opposition to Rose's editorial methods 
and results. The Estate's allegations included copyright infringement, 
"passing off," and violation of James Joyce's moral rights, although 
the moral rights theory evidently dropped out at some later stage of 
the litigation. 
After opening skirmishes in 1997, the Joyce Estate decided to pur 
sue the matter directly at trial, whereupon publication of "RE" went 
ahead as scheduled. In November 2001, after a full trial, Justice Lloyd 
of the English High Court, Chancery Division, ruled that "RE" had 
infringed the copyrights in certain genetic and archival materials 
published after Joyce's death?notably, the Rosenbach manuscript. 
See Sweeney v. Macmillan Publishers Ltd., Case No. CH 1997 S 3257, 
[2001] EWHC Ch B66 (Ch. 22 November 2001). Thus, after a well 
deserved retirement from the Joyce Wars, the Rosenbach manuscript 
has returned as a catalyst of controversy. 
Justice Lloyd's lengthy and carefully reasoned opinion addresses 
three principal issues: (1) Does "RE" infringe the copyright in any text 
of Ulysses published during Joyce's lifetime? (2) Does "RE" infringe 
the copyright in any work by Joyce published after his death? (3) 
Does "RE" constitute 
"passing off"?that is, is "RE" so different from 
the "class of goods" that is known to the reading and purchasing pub 
lic as 
"Ulysses by James Joyce" that "RE," as an instance of false label 
ing, has substantially harmed the "good will" that the Joyce Estate 
has acquired in the "trade name" of "Ulysses by James Joyce"? 
The court answered the first question in the negative. As noted 
above, lifetime editions of Joyce's works enjoy "revived" copyright in 
Britain, and these resurrected rights are subject to statutory limita 
tions that permit third parties to use or reproduce the works without 
permission in specified circumstances. Having begun the project of 
re-editing Ulysses prior to Britain's implementation date for EU 
revived copyrights (1 January 1996), Rose and his publisher raised as 
a defense their position as "reliance parties," that is, parties who 
relied upon the then public-domain status of Ulysses, and who, there 
fore, under British law, cannot be held to have infringed.23 
But in an interpretation of the reliance-party exemptions that may 
have significant implications for U.K. copyright law, the High Court 
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ruled that, because Rose had not actually completed his work on "RE" 
prior to certain cutoff dates set by the British regulations (1 January or 
1 July 1995, depending on the provision in question), and because he 
and Macmillan had not yet concluded a publishing contract or 
arrangement by either of those dates, the reliance-party exemptions 
do not apply to "RE."24 The court did rule, however, that another 
third-party exception?the one discussed above that provides for a 
compulsory license for any use of a revived copyright in Britain?res 
cued Rose and Macmillan from being infringers of any lifetime edi 
tion of Ulysses (in particular, the 1922 text, which the court deter 
mined had been Rose's primary source) and required only that 
Macmillan arrange for retroactive payment of a reasonable royalty to 
the Estate. 
Justice Lloyd did find infringement, however. The third-party 
exceptions for use of revived copyrights do not apply to copyrights 
that were never revived because they had never lapsed, such as those 
in the manuscript materials published in the James Joyce Archive in the 
1970s. In an interpretive move that recalls the text-editing theory 
known as 
"versioning," the court held that pre-publication versions 
of Ulysses, to the extent that they differ in some significant way from 
published versions, constitute independent authorial "works" for 
purposes of copyright. The court's analysis of this issue reaches 
heights of complexity reminiscent of the Joyce wars: 
[I]f I am right in concluding that each successive stage of Joyce's work 
on Ulysses, from the proto-drafts of particular sections, via the 
Rosenbach manuscript and the typescripts, to the various proofs, con 
stituted a new 
copyright work, at any rate in all cases where there was 
any change beyond the purely minimal and insignificant, it follows that 
the only work that was published was the last-pre-publication version, 
namely the final approved page proofs including any amendments 
made by Joyce on them. 
What Judge Woolsey's opinion was to the problem of obscenity law 
and avant-garde literary values, Justice Lloyd's opinion is to the inter 
play of copyright and textual theory. Both jurists, with the assistance 
of counsel and expert testimony, sought to understand the bearing of 
complex nonlegal theories on the law and on the phenomenon of 
Ulysses.25 
According to Justice Lloyd, then, the Rosenbach manuscript, which 
the court used to test for infringement, enjoys its own U.K. copyright 
as a separate work of authorship. Concluding that Rose's use of 
words and phrases drawn from the Rosenbach was "substantial," the 
court held that "RE" infringed the copyright in the Rosenbach. 
Moreover, in a ruling that points up the some of the differences 
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between British "fair dealing" and the generally more robust 
American doctrine of fair use, Justice Lloyd held that Rose's emenda 
tions did not qualify as fair dealing, because they categorically had 
not been made for "the purposes of research, private study, criticism 
and review." In short, Rose and Macmillan are infringers of the copy 
right in that authorial "work" known as the Rosenbach manuscript? 
that heterogeneous assemblage of autograph pages which Joyce prag 
matically cobbled together over several years for sale to a collector 
and which few scholars today would consider a "work" in any cre 
ative, organic sense. But copyright law has its own pragmatic needs, 
and for legal purposes, the Rosenbach is a "work." 
Finally, Justice Lloyd held that sales of "RE" did not constitute 
"passing off" of an inferior product under the trade name of "Ulysses 
by James Joyce."26 To be subject to passing off, the court noted, Ulysses 
would have to constitute a "class of goods" sufficient to be identified 
in the public mind with certain characteristics conferring "good will" 
on its present source, the Estate. When challenged to describe the 
characteristics defining this class of goods, counsel for the Estate 
pointed to Joyce's use of unconventional verbal forms, interior mono 
logue, and other distinctive literary techniques. But how, persisted 
the court, can we know when a product such as "RE" is or is not with 
in the alleged class of goods? Counsel replied that any edition 
approved by James Joyce himself or subsequently by his Estate is 
within the class. The court dismissed out of hand this circular and 
subjective definition, and rejected as well, for its "inherent uncertain 
ty," the suggestion that "the general body of academic opinion at any 
given time" could serve to define what is and what is not within the 
class of goods known as Ulysses. It is fortunate, in my view, that the 
court denied this 
"passing off" claim. The application of such an elas 
tic concept to a work of literature, if dignified by legal precedent, 
might strengthen the Estate's hand against any Lf/ysses-based project 
that it had not pre-approved and, further, might be used by owners of 
revived copyrights to circumvent the various third-party exemptions 
under British law. Courts are properly wary of attempts to add legal 
protections atop the copyright monopoly. 
To sum up, the principal points of Sweeney v. Macmillan are three: 
(1) With respect to revived copyrights, the court gave a narrow inter 
pretation to the U.K. reliance-party provisions but found that Rose 
and his publisher are permitted by a compulsory license to publish 
most of the text of "RE." (2) "RE" does infringe with respect to emen 
dations taken from archival materials published after 1941. This hold 
ing may make it harder for British editors and publishers to draw 
upon the James Joyce Archive without fear of legal reprisal. (3) The sale 
of "RE" does not constitute 
"passing off." 
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On the basis of its holding, the High Court granted an injunction 
against further infringement by Macmillan. According to newspaper 
accounts, the court also ordered an inquiry into the extent of damages 
suffered by the Estate. Pending an appeal by Macmillan, the court 
granted a stay of its order. In an article in the London Times for 23 
November 2001, Robin Young wrote that "[t]he judge made no order 
for costs, which he said were substantial given the amount of docu 
mentation and the expense of calling expert witnesses during the 
seven-day hearing. In the absence of an order, each side has to bear its 
own costs." This last point, if true, may significantly qualify the legal 
"victory" here. 
In remarks made during a broadcast over Irish radio, Medh Ruane 
suggested a curious justification for reprinting Joyce's words without 
leave of the Estate: "James Joyce used the city of Dublin and Dublin 
people in his books, so the argument goes that the people should have 
a moral and cultural right to use James Joyce's material in different 
ways." This is not the sort of argument that would carry much weight 
with a court, but it does point to some of the contradictions inherent 
in the private ownership of a public good like literature. Ulysses is a 
modern epic assembled from facts, personalities, and events in the 
Irish public domain; in that respect, it is not unreasonable for the Irish 
to view it as more immediately and intimately the property of the 
people than other works of the imagination. Joyce himself conceded 
that he was a 
"scissors-and-paste" man, an adapter and arranger of 
what came to hand. 
In the ecology of copyright, a work like Ulysses has its creative ori 
gins in the raw materials of the public domain. With the sanction of 
law, the work then comes under private control for a certain term, 
and, when the term has expired, the work returns to the public 
domain to increase those raw materials and to spur the creation of 
new works?and, incidentally, new copyrights. But excessively long 
copyright terms upset this ecological cycle. Today, sixty years after 
Joyce's death and eighty years since its first publication, Ulysses has 
become part of the furniture of our cultural life; it has outgrown the 
state-supplied monopoly that technically allows private parties to 
restrict its dissemination and adaptation?just as James Joyce has out 
grown the efforts of the Estate to shape his historical legacy according 
to criteria of family privacy. 
In his attempts to control the image of his grandfather, Stephen 
James Joyce has taken arms against the ungovernable sea of celebrity 
at precisely the moment when James Joyce is truly becoming an icon 
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of popular culture (as witness the explosion of dramatic and cine* 
matic treatments of his and Nora's lives in recent years). With increas 
ing frequency, Mr. Joyce has appeared in the role of the aggrieved 
plaintiff or outraged letter-writer seeking to contain history, to redi 
rect the discourse of the public sphere, to re-fence the cultural com 
mons. Armed with a few wasting copyrights and some sparse moral 
rights, and what personal authority he can command, he tilts repeat 
edly at the academic and pop-culture windmills that rapidly (and, 
indeed, sometimes vulgarly) make a commodity of a beloved mem 
ber of his family. 
Mr. Joyce's efforts are not without a certain quixotic integrity, but 
their strangely antic and belated quality serves to remind us that, in 
the normal course of culture, the protests of such an individual would 
not command much attention. But something has happened to the 
normal course of culture. Extremely long copyrights have given arti 
ficial voice and weight to the personal predilections of one who, in the 
absence of such rights, would be an ordinary participant in the life of 
art and letters like most of the rest of us. These protracted monopolies 
create, or permit, peculiar and unaccustomed distortions of the pub 
lic sphere; they encourage attempts to reprivatize that space, to 
reclaim it in the interests of the family circle or of personal taste. They 
allow a mere rightholder to become a privileged and arbitrary custo 
dian of culture.27 And all of this would be exactly as it should be (for 
I believe in copyrights and, as an attorney, help copyright owners to 
protect their rights), were these monopolies confined to one genera 
tion or two. But to see this capricious veto power being exercised at a 
period so startlingly remote from the cultural and historical origins of 
the work in question is dispiriting. The phrase "the dead hand" 
comes irresistibly to mind. 
Normally, we do not think of a "classic" as something that can be 
owned; most of the masterworks we encounter have long resided in 
the public domain, either because their copyrights have expired or 
because they were produced before the advent of copyright statutes. 
But with copyrights now capable of enduring for more than a centu 
ry, we can expect to see more works attain canonization in the public 
sphere while remaining subject to private control in the market 
place?unless such control handicaps the process of canonization in 
the first place. Therefore, it strikes me as a wholly understandable 
intuition that proclaims a "cultural right" to use Ulysses at this late 
date without permission, despite the fact that?fair use and other 
exceptions aside?the law recognizes no "cultural" defense as such. 
And I advocate no acts of infringement where copyright claims are 
genuine. 
In each of the cases described above, Stephen James Joyce has sued, 
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or asserted legal rights, on a theory of copyright infringement, but it 
should be apparent that his grievance has as much to do with the 
kinds of uses being made of his grandfather's works as with the fact 
of use per se. Although newspaper accounts have reported exorbitant 
permission fees demanded by the Estate, Mr. Joyce's chief concern, I 
believe, is with the "moral rights" that his grandfather enjoyed in his 
writings and that Mr. Joyce, in some countries of the world, is per 
mitted to enforce as the legal inheritor of those rights. As Carol Shloss 
explains in this issue, moral rights (such as rights of attribution and 
integrity) are legally distinct from economic rights (such as copy 
rights) and presuppose very different notions of authorial entitle 
ment. Mr. Joyce's concern about alleged "passing off" shows that it is 
the kind, not just the fact, of copying that exercises him. Copyright 
law punishes for unauthorized fidelity to the source text. Theories of 
passing off and moral rights seek redress for unauthorized deviations 
from the source text. 
Mr. Joyce's public attacks on Danis Rose's "RE" are filled with the 
language of moral rights, or droit d'auteur, as it is called in France. In 
a letter in the Times Literary Supplement for 27 June 1997, for example, 
Mr. Joyce alluded to his grandfather's attribution right (that is, his 
right to have his name associated with his own creations, not with 
"mutilations" of those creations or with the work of others): "To have 
had the audacity to put the name James Joyce on this outrageous mis 
representation of Ulysses ... is demeaning to his creative, imaginative 
genius.... If this book is to continue to be sold, the name James Joyce 
must be eliminated, stricken from the dust-jacket, over and inside 
title-pages of this edition." In the same letter, Mr. Joyce referred to his 
grandfather's right of integrity as well: "The integrity, the essence of 
James Joyce's novative [sic] writing has been obliterated." 
These legal concepts of integrity and attribution (or "paternity") 
derive from natural law and bear the impress of Romantic notions of 
organic expression and authorial uniqueness and sovereignty. They 
reflect a worldview that Shem's 
"pelagiarist pen" and "piously 
forged palimpsests" (in a chapter of Finnegans Wake that contains sev 
eral allusions to the law of 
"copriright") hilariously draw into ques 
tion (FW 182.03,02,185.30). Unfortunately for Mr. Joyce, the countries 
in which he would most like to enforce moral rights?the United 
States, the United Kingdom, the Irish Republic?either do not recog 
nize such rights in authors' works or recognize them in attenuated or 
qualified forms.28 In France, on the other hand, where Mr. Joyce 
resides, authors' moral rights are perpetual, inheritable, inalienable, 
and fully enforceable. 
The result, for Mr. Joyce, is a significant and probably maddening 
gap between perceived injury and desired remedy. He would like to 
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pursue a remedy appropriate to moral rights, but often he must make 
do with approximate and ill-fitting legal machinery supplied by the 
copyright regimes of various countries.29 This gap, or legal diff?rend, 
is particularly frustrating for the moral-rights claimant in that copy 
right law confers a monopoly that is designedly "porous," permitting 
a number of exceptions that favor users of protected works (such as 
fair use for purposes of commentary and parody, the uncopyrighta 
bility of facts and ideas, limited durational terms, and compulsory 
licenses). Copyright is thus a rather imprecise instrument for redress 
ing moral injury. 
Another way of putting this is to say that a legal regime, such as 
copyright, which strives to balance private monopoly and public 
access?the rights of individual owners and the needs of the cultural 
commons?will not always afford relief to one who seeks to deny cer 
tain uses altogether, in the name of moral or personal rights. Anglo 
American copyright law has the salutary effect of promoting the 
progress of culture?of which the public domain is an indispensable 
part?by granting authors exclusive rights, subject to certain excep 
tions and for limited times (although in recent years legislatures have 
seen fit to erode that important limitation by extending future and 
existing copyright terms). The public domain, which at the end of the 
day (or rather of the copyright) is entitled to recast Molly's mono 
logue as scabrous cabaret entertainment or to edit Joyce's masterwork 
according to principles that some might find objectionable, promotes 
the robust health of culture, permitting individuals to be active, trans 
formative users of authors' works, not mere passive consumers of 
products pre-approved by copyright owners. The public domain is 
the antithesis of an administered culture. 
Stephen James Joyce suffers, as his grandfather did, from the 
imperfect fit between injury and legal remedy. We all do. That is why 
we make peace with noisy neighbors and learn to live with dents in 
our car-doors. It is partly why James Joyce chose to render the pain of 
his Dublin youth under the aspect of art and in a language of 
accusatory realism wrought for that purpose. Much of the social 
coherence that we experience in our lives is the product of "order 
without law" (to borrow a phrase from the legal scholar Robert C. 
Ellickson)30?the sane, informal folkways of compromise and 
restraint that we engage in every day, mostly unawares. Courts and 
lawsuits are a deviation from this norm of quiet, nonadversarial res 
olution of disputes.31 
In the end, the public domain can be trusted to care for Ulysses 
properly. The slow, sifting process of culture can be relied upon to 
make the sorts of discriminations that ultimately preserve the integri 
ty of works of artistic significance. Joyce, like Homer and 
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Shakespeare, will survive seemingly repugnant or disrespectful adap 
tations of his works. After all, Homer and Shakespeare have survived 
Ulysses. 
Robert Spoo 
Valhalla, New York 
NOTES 
1 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (holding that a student's due 
process liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment is implicated when 
a school official, acting under color of state law, restrains and punishes the 
student for misconduct by inflicting pain, and concluding that due process is 
satisfied by an ex-post tort action brought under state law). Of course, 
Clongowes was not a "public" school in the American sense, and the United 
States Constitution has no legal relevance in the Irish context. I mention these 
unavailable remedies merely to highlight Stephen's legal helplessness at 
Clongowes. 
2 Older cases sometimes refer to 
exemplary or punitive damages as "vin 
dictive damages," a formulation that seems suited to the occasionally grudge 
bearing character of Joyce's "cruelfiction[s]" (FW 192.19). See, for instance, 
The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1,15 (1827) (Story, J.) (distinguishing between "remuner 
ative" or 
compensatory damages and "vindictive" damages). 3 
Joyce himself was almost made a defendant in 1919 when the Society of 
Authors protested the production of George Bernard Shaw's play, Mrs. 
Warren's Profession, by the English Players?the troupe Joyce had formed in 
Zurich?without permission from or payment to Shaw. Joyce defended his 
actions by pointing to the difficulty in wartime of obtaining a foreign-based 
author's consent and further suggested that the production of an English-lan 
guage play on the Continent was an exceptional case not governed by the 
Berne Convention on authors' rights. He also doubted that rights could exist 
for a play the performance of which had been declared illegal in England by 
the Lord Chamberlain (JJII 465-66). The irony of these justifications is that 
some of them mirror the legal rationalizations that Samuel Roth offered some 
years later for printing unauthorized installments of Ulysses in the United 
States. It is 
especially rich to see Joyce hinting at an "unclean hands" defense, 
whereby a copyright infringer asserts, as an affirmative defense, the immoral 
ity or obscenity of the work whose copyright he has allegedly violated. 4 The term "libel" in this context does not denote a type of defamation but 
rather a complaint or bill (an initiatory pleading) brought in a civil action in 
admiralty. The government in the Ulysses case was the "libellant," and the 
book itself, as defendant, was "libeled"?that is, subjected to legal process. 5 The essay first appeared under the title "Copyright Protectionism and Its 
Discontents: The Case of James Joyce's Ulysses in America," in the Yale Law 
Journal, 108 (December 1998), 633-67. A substantially longer version of the 
essay appeared under the title "Copyright and the Ends of Ownership: The 
Case for a Public-Domain Ulysses in America," in Joyce Studies Annual 1999, 
ed. Thomas F. Staley (Austin: Uni v. of Texas Press, 1999), 5-62. 6 
My argument here focuses exclusively on the 1922 Paris edition of 
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Ulysses. Later editions, including Random House's 1934,1961, and 1986 texts, 
present a different set of legal issues, as discussed in the version of this essay 
published in Joyce Studies Annual 1999. 7 Act of 27 October 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298,112 Stat. 2827 (codified at 17 
U.S.C. ? 304[b]). 
8 Charles Rossman, "The New Ulysses: The Hidden Controversy/' New York 
Review of Books (8 December 1988), 53. 9 Letter from Peter du Sautoy to Philip Gaskell (5 May 1983), Richard 
Ellmann Papers, McFarlin Library, University of Tulsa. 10 These copyright discussions have not been depicted fully or fairly in 
Joyce scholarship. The participants were not utterly unaware of the public 
interest or of the market limitations of a new, corrected Ulysses. On several 
occasions, for example, du Sautoy reminded his correspondents that the exis 
tence of a new copyright would not stop older editions from entering the 
public domain and returning under new imprints to vie with the Gabler edi 
tion at competitive prices. See, in this regard, the letter from du Sautoy to 
Stephen James Joyce (7 December 1982), Richard Ellmann Papers, McFarlin 
Library, University of Tulsa; see also the letter from du Sautoy to Ellmann, 
Gaskell, and Clive Hart (4 December 1981), noting that, despite any extension 
of copyright by means of the Gabler edition, "the larger sales will still go to 
the older uncorrected texts which will be out of copyright and cheaper/' 
The context of these letters suggests that the correspondents had the 
British Ulysses copyright chiefly in mind, though at times they alluded to the 
American copyright as well. When it is recalled that, at the time these letters 
were exchanged, the British copyright was scheduled to expire in ten years or 
so, the plan to secure a new derivative-work copyright in Ulysses seems much 
less momentous and overreaching than it might today in the wake of copy 
right revivals and extensions. At that time, prior to the twenty-year increase 
of United Kingdom copyright terms under the EU directive, public-domain 
versions of Ulysses, re-edited or merely reprinted, could be planned in Britain 
for the not-so-distant year of 1992. 
11 Rossman couched his criticisms in circumspect language, pointing to 
"the importance to the estate of establishing a new copyright" (p. 58). But the 
consensus back then, as Joyceans will recall, was that the Estate had been up 
to some pretty shady business in seeking to exploit the copyright in an edi 
tion that had received criticism from its own team of advisors. 
121 should note that the opinions expressed in this introduction do not nec 
essarily reflect the views of the James Joyce Quarterly or its editor, Sean 
Latham. 
13 John Kidd, "An Inquiry into Ulysses: The Corrected Text/' Papers of the 
Bibliographical Society of America, 82 (December 1988), 411, 426 (enumerating 
an editor's options for a "base text" of Ulysses). 
14 See Rossman, who discusses an editor's options for a "copytext" of 
Ulysses (p. 53). 15 And if this edition ever does come forth, does anyone suppose that it will 
not assert a fresh claim of copyright, just as the Gabler edition did? If Norton 
proceeds on the assumption that the 1922 edition is in the American public 
domain, Norton and/or Kidd will claim a new derivative-work copyright in 
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the re-edited text. If Norton arrives at an 
"arrangement" with the Estate that 
allows it to move ahead with the edition?see Warren St. John, "James Joyce 
and the Nutty Professor," New York Observer (29 December 1997), 1 ("'We've 
chosen to try to arrange things with the Joyce Estate/ said Victor Schmalzer, 
an executive vice president at Norton")?the Estate will claim a new deriva 
tive-work 
copyright in the re-edited text. Of one thing we can be certain: no 
one will offer to dedicate the new edition to the public domain. Copyright 
incentives just do not work that way. 16 See, on this point, Bruce Arnold, "The Ulysses Scandal," Independent (17 
June 1990), 14: "As a young student at Trinity College in the 1950s, I remem 
ber Thrift_He was a revered Fellow of the college. The Corrected Text buries 
him for eternity, and Kidd is justifiably outraged." I should add that Arnold 
was the first, to my knowledge, publicly to raise questions about the validity 
of the American Ulysses copyright. See Arnold, "Ulysses Baffling Copyright," 
Sunday Tribune (15 March 1992), 28. Kidd later took up this issue?for exam 
ple, in remarks quoted in St. John (p. 1). 
17 
These remarks are attributed to Sean Sweeney, not Mr. Joyce, in an arti 
cle by Lucy Adams, "Joyce Grandson in Battle to Ban Ulysses Musical," in The 
Sunday Times (Ireland) (30 July 2000). 18 The provision requires the user to give reasonable notice of the intended 
use and to offer a payment of reasonable royalties to the owner of a revived 
or restored 
copyright. If a reasonable amount cannot be agreed upon, the 
Copyright Tribunal will determine the license terms. Once the user has given 
reasonable notice, he or she is licensed, and the royalty may be determined 
later-Duration of Copyright and Rights in Performances Regulations, 1995 
S.I. No. 3297, ?? 24, 25. Thus, the license is compulsory or "as of right." The 
copyright owner can haggle over royalties, but he or she cannot refuse the 
license. 
19 Vanessa Thorpe, The Guardian/Observer (30 July 2000). 20 In the recent litigation over Alice Randall's revisionary novel The Wind 
Done Gone (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2001), the Margaret Mitchell Trust sued 
to prevent publication of what it argued was, inter alia, a derivative work 
based without authorization on Gone With the Wind (New York: Macmillan 
Publishers, 1936). Over the years, the Mitchell Trust has been extremely selec 
tive in permitting sequels to GWTW and has demanded that any derivative 
work it does authorize avoid such 
subjects as homosexuality and miscegena 
tion. TWDG confronts both. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the trial court's 
grant of a preliminary injunction to the plaintiff Trust, holding that, as a 
"highly transformative" parody, Randall's novel constitutes a fair use of oth 
erwise protected elements of GWTW. The court's strongly-worded opinion, 
which is unusual for the emphasis it places on First Amendment values in the 
copyright context, concludes that, in light of TWDG's transformative purpose 
and the unlikelihood that so subversive a work would usurp the market for 
the sanitized sequels that the Trust typically permits, the district court erred 
in issuing a preliminary injunction. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 
No. 01-12200, 2001 WL 1193890 (11th Cir. 10 October 2001); see also Neil 
Weinstock Netanel, "Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment 
Skein," Stanford Law Review, 54 (2001), who discusses Suntrust Bank's empha 
sis on free speech. Of course, GWTW is another work that has benefited from 
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the Sonny Bono Act's extension of older copyrights. Like Ulysses, moreover, 
GWTW has contributed a historical mythos to culture that has outgrown the 
copyright that permits its legal owners to police the adaptations that the 
mythos inspires or provokes. With its extended term, GWTW will remain in 
copyright until 2031, ninety-five years after its first publication and 168 years 
after the Emancipation Proclamation. 21 David Pierce, ed., Irish Writing in the Twentieth Century: A Reader (Cork: 
Cork Univ. Press, 2000). 
22 
Specifically, the Cork University Press argued that it could lawfully 
receive a sublicense to print extracts of the Danis Rose edition from Rose's 
current licensee, Macmillan Publishers Ltd., under ? 14(2) of the European 
Communities (Term of Protection of Copyright) Regulations, 1995 S.I. No. 
158, as adopted in the Irish Republic. This regulation insulates from liability 
any "person" that "has acquired (whether before or after commencement of 
these Regulations) rights" in a work "from a person exploiting that work or 
other matter [if] copyright in that work or other matter has been revived by 
virtue of these Regulations." This broadly drafted language raises a number 
of knotty questions that the Irish High Court was unwilling to resolve on a 
motion for a preliminary injunction. Unfortunately, because the Press did not 
pursue the matter at a trial for a permanent injunction, these questions were 
not addressed definitively in the context of the Rose edition in Ireland. There 
is no doubt that under Britain's counterpart to the Irish regulations, an 
anthology issued in Northern Ireland or Britain could have printed extracts 
of the 1922 Ulysses under the compulsory license provision discussed else 
where in this introduction. The Irish regulations lack such a compulsory 
license, however. This divergence between Ireland's and Britain's EU imple 
mentation rules points up some of the obstacles facing "third parties" who 
hope for wide dissemination in Europe of works they have created on the 
basis of works whose copyrights were revived by the EU copyright-term 
Directive. See Brad Sherman and Lionel Bently, "Balance and Harmony in the 
Duration of Copyright: The European Directive and Its Consequences," 
Textual Monopolies: Literary Copyright and the Public Domain, ed. Patrick 
Parrinder and Warren Chernaik (London: Centre for English Studies and the 
Office for Humanities Communication, 1997), p. 23: "Differences in the nature 
of the transitional provisions adopted by each country are regrettable [and] 
produce further possible trade barriers within the European Economic Area." 
For a more detailed discussion of the Pierce anthology and the litigation sur 
rounding it, as well as the Estate's lawsuit against Danis Rose and Macmillan 
Publishers, see my article, "A Rose Is a Rose Is a Roth" (forthcoming in the 
James Joyce Literary Supplement). 23 Duration of Copyright and Rights in Performances Regulations, 1995 S.I. 
No. 3297, ? 23. 
24 To put this another way, it was no defense that Rose finished most of his 
work on "RE" while the 1922 Ulysses was out of copyright in Britain or that 
he and Macmillan had engaged in preliminary contract discussions. 
Macmillan's defense would have been a good one only if Rose either had 
begun and finished "RE" within the public-domain window or had signed a 
publishing contract, or made more substantial arrangements with Macmillan, 
during that interval. 
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251 do not mean to imply that either judge was incapable of grasping com 
plex nonlegal issues on his own. Certainly Judge John M. Woolsey was a cul 
tured and widely-read individual. But just as Judge Woolsey's sensitivity to 
the literary significance of Ulysses was aided by attorney Morris L. Ernst's 
learned arguments and the evidentiary submissions of opinions authored by 
literary critics, so Justice Lloyd received substantial assistance from the oral 
and written testimony of Joyceans and scholars of textual editing. 
26 It will be recalled that what little legal relief James Joyce himself 
obtained against Samuel Roth's piracies of Ulysses in the United States came 
in the form of a state-court finding of passing off or unfair competition. 
27 Of course, one reply to this is to say that a grandson is no "mere 
rightholder." I realize that there are two sides to the question. Unfortunately, 
in this case, I can occupy only one of them. I have more sympathy for the 
plight of Mr. Fennessy, the banned composer: "[H]ow can the personal taste 
of Stephen Joyce and his wife be thought the right criteria to use?" But, for an 
intelligent and compassionate exposition of the other, familial perspective, 
see Michael Patrick Gillespie, "The Papers of James Joyce: Ethical Questions 
for Textually Ambivalent Critics," New Hibernia Review, 2 (Winter 1998), who 
examines family privacy and scholarly access in connection with archival 
materials relating to Joyce. 
28 The United Kingdom adopted statutory moral rights in 1988, pursuant 
to its obligations under the Berne Convention. See the Copyright, Designs 
and Patents Act of 1988. These rights include rights of attribution and integri 
ty and are closely tied, in their duration and in other respects, to U.K. copy 
right law. Mr. Joyce's early attacks on the Rose edition suggested that he con 
sidered that text to have subjected Ulysses to "derogatory treatment" amount 
ing to "distortion or mutilation of the work, or 
... otherwise prejudicial to the 
honor or reputation of the author"?C.D.RA. ? 80(l)-(2). Evidently the Estate 
did not pursue its moral-rights claims in the later stages of Sweeney v. 
Macmillan. Perhaps this is because the theory had little chance of success in 
the first place. After all, can a serious effort at scholarly editing, however dis 
tasteful to an heir, constitute derogatory treatment? Are not moral rights in a 
work enjoying an EU-revived copyright statutorily limited just as that copy 
right is limited? The answer to this last question would appear to be yes: "It 
is not an infringement of any moral right to do anything that by virtue of this 
Regulation [governing third-party uses of revived copyrights] is not an 
infringement of copyright"?Duration of Copyright and Rights in 
Performances Regulations, 1995 S.I. No. 3297, ? 23(6). 
The statutory law of moral rights in the United States is limited to works 
of visual art. My understanding is that moral rights are virtually nonexistent 
in the Irish Republic. 29 In this respect, Mr. Joyce has inherited his grandfather's disabilities as a 
foreign-domiciled plaintiff. As noted above, when James Joyce sought dam 
ages and an injunction in his 1927 suit against Samuel Roth, his New York 
attorneys had to resort to a rather unsatisfying theory of passing off or unfair 
competition, which later, in his 1937 address before the International P.E.N. 
Congress, Joyce strained to equate to a moral-rights remedy 30 See Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes 
(Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1991). 
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31 
Compare Abraham Lincoln's wry advice to lawyers: "Discourage litiga 
tion. Persuade your neighbors to compromise whenever you can. Point out to 
them how the nominal winner is often a real loser?in fees, and expenses, and 
waste of time. As a peace-maker the lawyer has a superior opertunity [sic] of 
being a good man. There will still be business enough"?Lincoln, "Notes on 
the Practice of Law" (ca. 1850), in The Portable Abraham Lincoln, ed. Andrew 
Delbanco (New York: Viking Books, 1992), p. 34. 
351 
This content downloaded from 129.244.1.198 on Thu, 11 Jul 2013 15:35:27 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
UNITE) STATES DISTRICT COURT 
South*? District of New York: 
ttttti tt tt ft tt tt ft ?i rf n*r'Tfiti ttti ft if tt ti u tf u n ft tf ftttfttt h ft tl tf tl 
tt 
United State? of Amarlo a, * 
Ubelant ? 
n 
Y, ? OPIHION 
n 
One Book called "Ulysses" " a? 110-59 





ff n tf it ?t tt tf tf tt rf m rt n rf rr rt tt ft tt tt t? ft tt tf ti it tt rt ft ft tt tt tf it rt ff ft 
On oross motion? for a decree in a libel of 
eonfiaoatioBt supplemented by a stipulation - hereinafter 
described - brought by the united State? against the book 
"Ulysses" by James Joyce? under Section 305 of the Tariff 
Aot of 1930, Title 19 United State? Code? seotion 1505, on 
the ground that the book i? obscene within the* meaning of 
that Section, and, henoe, 1? not importable into the United 
State?, but 1? sub J cot to seizure, forfeiture and confisca 
tion and destruction. 
United states Attorney 
- 
by Sanuel C. Co lema n, s?q. and 
Bich?las Atlas, Esq., of counsel - for the United State?, 
in support of motion for a decree of forfeiture, and in 
opposition to motion for a decree dismissing the libel 
Mnaarm, Oreenbaum, Wolff & Ernst, 
- by Morris L. Ernst,Sect?, 
and Alexander Lindey, Esq., of oounsel - attorneys for 
claimant Random House, Inc., in support of motion for 
a deoree dismissing the libel, and in opposition to 
notion for a decree of forfeiture. 
Figure 1. Original typescript of Federal District Court Judge John M. 
Woolsey's 1933 decision in United States v One Book Called "Ulysses 
" 
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-8 
wooLssr, J? 
The motion for a decree dismissing the libel 
herein is granted, and, consequently, of course, tht 
Governments notion for a dssrss of forfslturs and destruc 
tion is denied? 
Accordingly a dsorss dismissing th* llbsl with 
out costs may be sntsrsd herein, 
I* The practice followed in this oase is in 
aeoordanoe with the suggestion made by me in the oase of 
united states t. one Book Entitled "Contraception*, 51 j. 
(Ed) 585, and Is as follows! 
After Issue was joined by the filing of the 
claimant's answer to the libel for forfeiture against 
"Ulysses" f a stipulation was made between the United 
States Attorney* s of floe and the attorneys for the olaia 
ant proTldlngs 
1? That the book "Ulysses* should be deemed to 
hare been annexed to and to have become part of the libel 
just as if It had been incorporated In Its entirety there 
in, 
8? That the parties waired their right to a 
trial by jury. 
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f ? That each party agreed to move for decree 
in Its favor. 
4, That on such cross motions the court might 
decide all the questions of law and fact involved and 
render a general finding thereon. 
5? That on the decision of such motions the 
decree of the court might be entered as If It were a 
decree after trial? 
It seems to me that a procedure of this kind 
is highly appropriate In libels for the confiscation of 
books such as this? It Is an especially advantageous 
procedure in the Instant ease because on account of the 
length of "Ulysses" and the difficulty of reading it, a 
jury trial would have been an extremely unsatisfactory, 
If not an almost Impossible, method of dealing with it? 
XX? I have read "Ulysses" once in its entirety 
and X have read those passages of which the Government 
particularly complains several times. Xn fact, for many 
weeks, my spare time has been devoted to the considera 
tion of the decision which my duty would require me to 
make in this matter? 
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"Ulysses" is not an easy book to read or te 
understand. But there has been auch written about it, 
and in order properly to approach the consideration of it 
It Is advisable to read a number of other books whloh have 
now become its satellites. The study of "Ulysses" Is, 
therefore, a heavy task? 
XII. The reputation of "Ulysses" In the 
literary world, however, warranted my taking such time as 
was necessary to enable me to satisfy myself as to the 
Intent with which the book was written, for, of oouree, in 
any oase where a book is claimed to be obscene it must first 
be d et e mined, whether the Intent with which it was written 
was what is called, according to the usual phrase, porno 
graphic, - that is, written for the purpose of exploiting 
obscenity? 
If the oone&uslon is that the book is porno 
graphic that Is the end of the Inquiry and forfeiture 
must follow. 
But In "Ulysses", in spite of Its unusual 
frankness, I do not detect anywhere the leer of the sen 
sualist? X hold, therefore, that it is not pornographic. 
XT. In writing "Ulysses", Joyoe sought to 
make a serious experiment In a new, if not wholly novel, 
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literary genre. He takes persons ef the lower middle 
class llTing in Dublin in 1904 and seek? not only to 
describe what they did on a certain day sarly In June of 
that year as they went about the City bent on their usual 
occupations, but also to tell what many of them thought 
about the while? 
Joyce has attempted - it scorns to me, with 
astonishing success- to show how the screen of conscious 
ness with its eror shifting kaleidoscopic Impressions 
carries, as it were on a plastic palimpsest, not only 
what 1? in the focus of each man'? observation of the 
actual things about him, but also in a penumbra! zone 
residua of past impressions, son? recent and some drawn 
tap by association from the domain of the subconscious* 
He shows how each of these impressions affects the life 
and beharior of the character which he is describing. 
What he seeks to get is not unlike the result 
ef a double or, if that Is possible, a aulpitlc exposure 
on a cinema film which would give a olaar foreground with 
a background risible but somewhat blurred and out of 
focus in varying degrees. 
To convey by words an effect which obviously 
lends itself more appropriately to a graphic technique, 
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accounts, it seems to me, for much of the obscurity which 
meets a reader of "Ulysses". And it also explains 
another aspect of the book, which I have further to con 
sider, namely, Joyce's sincerity and his honest effort to 
show exactly how the minds of his characters operate. 
If Joyce did not attempt to be honest In 
developing the technique which he has adopted in "Ulyssesrr 
the result would be psychologically misleading and thus 
unfaithful to his chosen technique. Such an attitude 
would be artistically inexcusable. 
It is because Joyce has been loyal to his 
technique and has not funked its neoese&ry implications, 
but has honestly attempted to tell fully what his charac 
ter! think about, that he has bean the subject of so many 
attaoks and tfcet his puipoee has been so often misunder 
stood and misrepresented. Tor his attempt sincerely and 
honestly to realize his objeotlve has required him inci 
dentally to use certain words which are generally con 
sidered dirty words and has led at times to what many 
think Is a too poignant preocoupation with sex in the 
thoughts of his characters. 
The words which are criticized as dirty are 
old Saxon words known to almost all men and, X venture, 
to many women, and are such words as would be naturally 
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ana habitually used, I believe, by the types of folk whose 
life, physical and mental, Joyce is seeking to describe? 
In rcspeot ef the recurrent emergence of the Tnome of sex 
In the minds of hid characters, it must always bo remem 
bered that his locale was celtio and his season Spring. 
Whether or not one enjoys such a technique as 
Joyce U?03 Is a mut-uer of saste on which disagreement or 
arguaen? is futile, but to subject that technique to the 
standards of some othar technique seems to me to be little 
short of absurd. 
Aecoi*dingly, l hold that TfUlya?es^ is a 
dlnoere and honeot book and X think tnat the criticisms 
o? it tire er-wirol/ disposed of by its rationale. 
V. Turthermors, "Ulys?es" is an amazing 
tour do force when one considers the success whioh has 
been in the main achieved with such a difficult ebjeotive 
as Joyoe set for himself. as I have stated, "Ulysses" 
is not an eaay book to read. It 1? brilliant and dull, 
intelligible and ob s our e by turns. in r?any pi? oes it 
earns to me to be disgusting, but altfough it contains, 
as I have mentionod above, many words usually considered 
dirty, I have net found anything that I consider to be 
dirt for dirt*s sake. Baoh word of the book contributes 
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Uke a bit of m?sale to the detail of the picture which 
Joyce is seeking to construct for his readers. 
If one does not wish to associate with such 
folk as joyoe describes, that Is one's own choice? In 
order to avoid Indirect oantaot with them ene may not 
wish to read "Ulysses"! that Is quite understandable. 
But when such a real artist In words, as Joyce undoubtedly 
Is, seeks to draw a true picture of the lower middle class 
in a European city, ought It to be Impossible for the 
imerioan publie legally to see that picture? 
To answer this question it is not sufficient 
merely to find, as I have found above, that Joyoe did not 
write "Ulysses" with what Is commonly sailed pornographie 
Intent, I must endeavor to apply a more objective standard 
to his book In order to determine Its effect In the result, 
Irrespective of the Intent with which It was written. 
71? The statute under which the libel is 
filed only denounces, in so far as we are here conoerned, 
the Importation into the United states from any foreign 
country of "any obscene book". Section 305 of the Tariff 
Aot of 1950, Title 19 United States Code, Section 1305. 
It does not marshal against books the spectrum of con 
demnatory adjectives j^ound, oommonly, in laws dealing 
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with matters of this kind. X am, therefore, only required 
to determine whether "Ulysses" Is obscene within the legal 
definition of that word. 
The meaning of the word "obscene" as legally 
defined by the courts 1st tending to stir the sex Impulses 
or to lead to sexually Impure and lustful thoughts, punlop 
v. United States, 165 U. S? 486, 501; united States v. One 
Book Entitled "Ifrrrlcd Love". 48 ? (8d) 881, 884; united 
States v. One Book Entitled "Contraception". 51 y. (8d) 
585, 588; and compare pysart v. united States, 878 u. S. 
655, 657; Swearlngen v* United states, 161 u. S. 446, 450; 
United States v. Dennett, 39 7. (84) 564, 568 (C.C.A.8); 
People v. Wendung. 858 I. T. 451, 463. 
Whether a particular book would tend to excite 
such Impulses and thoughts must be tested by the court's 
opinion as to its effect en a person with average sex 
lnstinots - what the Trench would call l'homme moyen 
sensuel - who plays, In this branch of legal inquiry, the 
same role of hypothetical reagent as does the "reasonable 
man" in the law of torts and "the man learned in the art" 
on questions of Invention in patent law. 
The risk involved in the use of suoh a reagent 
arises from the Inherent tendency of the trier of facts, 
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however fair he may intend to be, to make his reagent too 
much subservient to his own idiosyncrasies. Here, I have 
attempted to avoid this, if possible, and to make ay re?* 
agent herein more objective than he might otherwise be, 
toy adopting the following course: 
After I had made my decision in regard to the 
aspect of "Wlyssee", now under consideration, I oheoked 
my impressions with two friends of mine who in my opinion 
answered to the above stated requirement for my reagent? 
These literary assessors - as I might properly 
describe them - were called en separately, and neither 
knew that I was consulting the other. They are men whose 
opinion ?n literature and on life I value most highly. 
They had both read "Ulysses", and, of course, were wholly 
unconnected with this cause. 
Without letting either of my assessors know 
what my decision was, I gave to eaoh of them the legal 
definition of obscene and asked eaoh whether in his 
opinion "Ulysses" was obscene within that definition. 
I was Interested to find that they both agreed 
with my opinion: that reading "Ulysses" in its entirety, 
as a book must be read on such a test as this, did not 
tend to exoite sexual impulses or lustful thoughts but 
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that it? net effect on them wa? only that of a somewhat 
trmgio and very powerful commentary on the inner lives ef 
and women. 
It is only with the normal person that the law 
is concerned. Such a test as I have described, therefore, 
is the only proper test of obsoenlty in the ease of a book 
like "Ulysses" which is a sincere and serious attempt to 
devise a new literary method for the observation and 
description of mankind? 
I am quite aware that owing to some of its 
scenes "Ulysses" is a rather strong draught to ask some 
sensitive, though normal, personsto take. But my con 
sidered opinion, after long reflection, is that whilst in 
many places the effect of "Ulysses" on the reader undoubted 
ly is somewhat emetic, no where docs it tend to be an 
aphrodisiac. 
"Ulysses" may, therefore, be admitted into the 
United states. 
December 6, 1933 
United states District judge 
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Figure 2. Map of the United States showing locations in 1932-1933 of libraries 
that either owned Ulysses or would add it to their collections if available. 
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The map was an exhibit attached to a preliminary memorandum submitted 
on behalf of Random House by attorney Morris L. Ernst. 
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